Driver's License Integrity

States have moved rapidly to address a variety of issues that were highlighted by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 related to driver's license issuance, administration and enforcement, and verifiability. (See Appendix A) Although not essential to or directly related to the atrocities committed on 9-11, discovering that many of the terrorists held driver's licenses - some fraudulently issued and some from states with lax issuance standards - has focused state leaders' attention on the many opportunities to improve driver's license integrity for a host of important public safety reasons. In 2000 alone, drivers with invalid licenses killed over 6,200 people and the total economic impact of invalid drivers in that one-year is estimated to have exceeded $25 billion. (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) Enhancing issuance standards, driver's license document authenticity, and driver information verifiability will significantly improve the driver's license for its only required use - to prove state sanction to operate a motor vehicle - and for its many permissive uses that relate to proving identity. States are also increasingly cognizant of incidents of fraud and neglect that pervade many driver's license issuing authorities, an issue at the heart of comprehensive driver's license program reform.

Federal legislation to preempt states' control of their driver's license programs is currently being considered in Congress. This legislation is unnecessary because states are rising to the challenge of addressing this important issue, subject to significant legal challenge, and likely would create a huge unfunded mandate for states. Additionally, it would be considerably less effective than state action.

The purpose of this document is to define the issues that states must address in order to improve driver's license integrity and to propose a variety of options for state officials' consideration.

Rhode Island passed the first driver's license law in 1908. Since then, every state and territory has established a host of statutory provisions and administrative regulations to govern the privilege of driving. Driver's licenses were created for the purpose of protecting public safety by recognizing those individuals who met the necessary standards to receive state sanction to operate a motor vehicle. Generally, those standards include age, knowledge of traffic laws, physical capability to drive, and practical driving competence. Today, although driver's licenses are also used for many permissive purposes tied to verifying identity - from obtaining a library card to cashing a check to boarding an aircraft - the principal purpose of a driver's license remains unchanged; the only required use of a driver's license is to prove state sanction to drive. And, except for the commercial driver's license (CDL), states retain control of the standards governing driver's license issuance and enforcement. All states have required drivers to be licensed since 1954.

Driver's licenses are issued by states under the Constitutional authority of the Tenth Amendment, which reads "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." The result is that individual states have adopted driving standards appropriate to their own residents and have vested the authority to issue driver's licenses in a variety of state agencies. While a majority of states leave it to their respective Departments of Motor Vehicles or Departments of Transportation, this authority in some states is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State or even the State Tax Commission. (See Appendix B)

A driver's license represents a tool that affords its holder vastly increased mobility to move within a state and among states. Therefore, states have collaborated to ensure the safety of the nation's roads. Two interstate compacts - contractual agreements among the states - govern states' administration of drivers. The Driver License Compact (DLC) and the Nonresident Violator Compact (NRVC) provide a means for state cooperation and information sharing. These compacts were developed by the states and are currently administered by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA). The DLC, created in 1961, ensures that a driver's home state receives and processes information about traffic violations committed by that driver in another state. Forty-five states have adopted the DLC. The NRVC standardizes methods used by different jurisdictions to process traffic citations received by out of state residents. Forty-four states have adopted the NRVC since its development in 1972. These compacts, while limited in scope, illustrate the states' ability for cooperative action.

In 1986, under its authority to regulate interstate commerce, the federal government enacted the "Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act" (CMVSA). This act established national standards for the issuance of the CDL. Commercial drivers have required a CDL since 1992. According to the US Department of Transportation (USDOT), CDL's represent approximately 5% of the total number of driver's licenses issued in the United States. The USDOT reports that the United States has approximately 190 million licensed drivers.

Current Issues

A more effective structure for states to comprehensively enforce driving laws would significantly enhance public safety, as would individual state action. Such enhancements would include the following elements:

Integrity of license issuance - Ensuring that the person receiving a license meets necessary driving competency standards and has a verifiable identity.

Verifiability - Providing access to appropriate law enforcement officials to verify the authenticity of the license document, driving history, and identity of the license holder.

All states verify the identity of a potential license holder before issuing a driver's license. The documents used to verify identity for this purpose are known as "foundation documents" because they provide the building blocks of personal information on which the license is issued. Foundation documents range from birth certificates, to utility bills, to passports, to other state's driver's licenses. The principal challenge related to foundation documents is states' ability to verify their authenticity and validity. States do not routinely verify, for instance, that the foundation documents with which they're presented are authentic (i.e. that the document is genuine) or valid (i.e. that the document is eligible to be used). For example, a deceased individual's birth certificate may be authentic, but it is invalid for use as a foundation document for a driver's license. Richard Varn, CIO of the State of Iowa provides a detailed discussion of this issue. In sum, Varn says that states must increase their ability to verify the authenticity and validity of foundation documents. He also provides the outline of an information infrastructure framework for doing so. Currently, few states actively verify foundation documents. Additionally, relying on an individual state employee's ability to recognize authentic documents is nearly impossible. Indeed, the Secret Service recently reported that the United States produces more than 16,000 different kinds of birth certificates.

A second but related issue is the process by which a state ensures that the individual presenting valid foundation documents is indeed the individual to whom those documents belong. It is possible, in other words, for Jane to present Sally's birth certificate and get a valid driver's license in Sally's name. The birth certificate itself is an authentic document but it does not belong to the person presenting it. Varn suggests that the use of foundation documents alone to prove identity is inadequate.

Then, of course, there's fraud. Fraudulent issuance of driver's licenses comes in two forms - fraud that occurs without the cooperation of the licensing authority and fraud that occurs with it. It is clear that the current system provides an individual who chooses to produce fraudulent foundation documents with a significant opportunity to illegally hold a valid license or licenses. As will be discussed later, such documents provide the ability to assume the identity of another individual in order to affirmatively commit a host of criminal offenses or to avoid responsibility for previously committed acts. It is in states' interests to create a system that significantly hampers criminals' ability to misuse the driver's license system.

The most comprehensive system, however, is only as strong as its weakest link. In many states, the weak link has proven to be licensing authority employees. News stories about such incidents abound and as the driver's license system is improved and the driver's license becomes a more secure and valuable document, it is likely that employee fraud, if unaddressed, will increase.

On October 1, 2000, for instance, the "Orange County Register" reported that California Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) employees were selling fraudulent driver's licenses for up to $4000 a piece and that 60 active cases of fraud existed. In New Jersey, rings of DMV employees selling licenses for thousands of dollars a piece were uncovered by law enforcement during a two-year investigation according to "The Star-Ledger." Additionally, at least one state's motor vehicle administrator has stated publicly that her state does not input all relevant driving citations into the appropriate database. It is likely that the known incidents of fraud (and neglect) are merely the "tip of the iceberg" of issues related to driver's license administration.

Although most driver's license holders may very well believe that a law enforcement official in one state can quickly and accurately verify driver history on a driver from another state, the reality is much different. Although systems exist for this purpose, it can take from 30 to 60 minutes or longer to access driver record information in another state. The result is a practical inability to verify license information and driver history in real time. It is possible, then, that an individual stopped for a traffic offense could produce a counterfeit license - in the name of an individual who does not even exist - and escape detection. Another scenario is that an individual could produce a license in his or her own name that the law enforcement official could not immediately learn had been revoked or suspended. This is a significant public safety issue, since according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) individuals with invalid driver's licenses caused approximately 11% of fatal accidents in 2000. The cost in human life - over 6,200 fatalities - injuries, property damage, and increased insurance premiums is enormous. In fact, based on available NHTSA data, the economic cost of these fatal accidents alone was over $6 billion. And, the economic impact of all accidents in 2000 caused by invalid drivers is estimated to have exceeded $25 billion.

In addition to the acknowledged law enforcement need to verify the authenticity and validity of the license document and have real-time access to driver history information, it is also clear that the document must belong to the person holding it. The concept of collecting and using uniquely individual personal identifiers to tie driver's license holders to their license is decades old. Most states require a picture and even physical description to appear on license documents. The issue, though, is whether states should incorporate additional kinds of uniquely individual personal identifiers (e.g. fingerprints, retinal scans, etc.) into their licensing process and license documents to strengthen the connection between the license holder and the document and to decrease fraudulent issuance and use. Additional measures to improve verifiability are certainly warranted.

There are many compelling public safety reasons to improve driver's license programs in individual states and the system for sharing information among states. It is difficult to defend, for instance, issuing authentic licenses to imposters and failing to adequately share information about unsafe drivers. However, those interested in laying the foundation for a national identification system, make two obviously false arguments for system reform. It's important to understand these arguments in order to fully appreciate the implications of pending driver's license system reform currently before Congress - legislation that would "federalize" the driver's license.

First, it is factually accurate that many of the September 11^th terrorists held driver's licenses. Several terrorists were issued licenses under false identities and others held licenses in their own names. While it is clear that no state licensing authority would ever intentionally issue a driver's license to a terrorist, it is impossible to conceive of a driver's license system that could screen out individuals intending to use the license in the commission of some future crime. Certainly, recent experience in the Midwest involving a college student planting explosives in mailboxes proves that. (It is interesting to note, too, that a driver's license in that case proved to have a much more direct relationship to the crimes committed than did the licenses held by the September 11^th terrorists. It has even been suggested that "federalizing" the sale of box cutters, an admittedly absurd suggestion, would be a more relevant response to the September 11^th attacks than "federalizing" the driver's license.)

It must also be understood that the federal government has sole responsibility for admitting, regulating, and monitoring foreign nationals in the country. With regard to foreign terrorists, the federal government must prevent these individuals from entering the country in the first place. With regard to foreign nationals it chooses to admit, the federal government must at least make information about these individuals available to states in real time so that visas and other documents can be verified. The federal government may even want to consider certifying certain foreign nationals as eligible to receive a driver's license. And, states may wish to re-evaluate whether issuing licenses to "non-status" immigrants is appropriate, despite important public safety reasons for doing so. Should the federal government attempt to shift responsibility for monitoring foreign nationals to the states, the costs and liability issues for the states are enormous. Regardless of the approach, the federal government must provide significant leadership and direction to states on these matters and must be held accountable when it fails to do so. The best driver's license system will not and cannot stop terrorism. The suggestion that it could hampers important reform efforts.

Second, the problem of "identity theft" in the United States is significant. Indeed, it is used as a principal argument for improving the verifiability of driver's licenses. The argument is this - There are over 500,000 cases of identity theft a year. The driver's license is the most widely used form of personal identification. Improving the current driver's license system and creating a better driver's license document can eliminate identity theft. (See Betty Serian's testimony to Congress, April 16, 2002.)

A close examination of this argument reveals its significant flaws. First, the term "identity theft," as used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), is an umbrella designation for a variety of crimes that require the criminal misuse by one person of another person's personal information, even including the digital signature of a cell phone. The FTC's own statistics show that the vast majority of "identify theft" is actually credit fraud and bears little relation to the issuance of a driver's license. Indeed, although the FTC's Identity Theft Hotline telephone counselors do not specifically ask callers whether a fake driver's license was implicated in their case, callers are offered the opportunity to volunteer that information. Fake driver's licenses are reported in 2.7% of cases.

Second, the "over 500,000" figure is exaggerated by as much as 500 percent. The number comes from self-reporting by the three major credit-reporting agencies (Equifax, Esperian, and TransUnion) to the General Accounting Office (GAO). Because these agencies became concerned that individuals were placing "fraud alerts" on their accounts prophylacticly, whether they had actually been victims of credit fraud or not, the agencies changed their fraud alert procedures. Now, fraud alerts come in two forms. The first is a 30-day fraud alert, placed following an initial report of credit fraud. The second is a permanent fraud alert, placed upon request after the initial 30-day fraud alert expires. That change has reduced the estimated number of "identity theft" cases from over 500,000 to approximately 100,000 cases per year.

The result is that the best data available from the FTC suggests that the number of cases of identity theft per year, in which a falsified driver's license is implicated, is about 2,700, far fewer than the 500,000 plus cases suggested in recent Congressional testimony. It must also be noted that a breakdown of how those 2,700 licenses were issued does not exist. The vast majority of those could involve fraudulent issuance by licensing authority employees, for instance. This is important because it suggests that any reform of individual driver's license programs or the cooperative driver's license system must begin with a close examination of fraud in driver's license administration offices.

It is also important to note that those who advocate the use of the driver's license to stop the much larger and vaguely related problem of "identity theft" in its various forms admit that they want to expand the required use of a driver's licenses to non-driving purposes (e.g. the verification of identity for a host of other activities - banking, health care, etc.). This has enormous implications. Doing that would require tying public and private databases together. Such a system could certainly not be characterized as anything less than a "national identification system," with significant opportunities for misuse of information, violations of privacy, and license holder "tracking." Additionally, a large percentage (approximately 33%) of American citizens, residents, and visitors don't have driver's licenses because they don't drive. It is probable that such proposals would ultimately lead to the requirement that everyone be "licensed" in some form by the government whether they intend to drive or not. In other words, the driver's license would become an identity license.

By arguing that driver's licenses are more than they are and that any possible "fix" to the current driver's license system must address a range of unrelated collateral matters, advocates for an enhanced "identity security" system cloud the real issues and hamper an appropriate and effective solution. States should move to improve the integrity of issuance of driver's licenses and the verifiability of those licenses because doing so will address important public safety concerns related directly to the primary purpose of a license - state sanction to operate a motor vehicle - and will improve the license document for a host of other permissive uses. The scope of a real solution, then, must address the following elements:

Issuance Standards - States should consider adopting standards for issuing driver's licenses that include the use of verifiable (e.g. authentic and valid) foundation documents. Such standards will necessarily involve enhancement of the control and verifiability of foundation documents within states, among states, and between states and the federal government.

Driver Information - Collection, Sharing, and Exchange - States should consider enhancing their ability to share information about drivers with one another by consistently collecting and sharing driver information. This information should then be available to appropriate law enforcement officials in real time.

State Operation and Enforcement - States should consider examining their own driver's license authorities and should consider whether their lead law enforcement organization should take an enhanced role in administering the driver's license program. Although the integrity of current licensing authorities clearly varies from state to state, fraud in offices that issue licenses is a significant issue and cannot be ignored. An enhanced law enforcement role in licensing administration would likely greatly reduce fraud, ensure compliance with established standards, and promote government efficiency by tying the issuance of licenses to the enforcement of them. Additionally, states should consider additional penalties for criminal activity related to the improper issuance or manufacture of driver's licenses.

Tamper and Counterfeit-Proof Features - States should consider making the driver's license document more tamper resistant and difficult to counterfeit.

Accurate and Reliable Personal Identifiers - States should consider enhancing the type of uniquely individual personal identifiers they use to tie a driver to a driver's license document. This information should be verifiable in real time by appropriate law enforcement officials.

Verifiability - States should consider enhancing their communications and information infrastructure to allow real time access to driving history information, as well as the ability to verify the authenticity of the driver's license document.

The acknowledged issues with the current driver's license system provide states with a significant opportunity to drastically increase public safety and reduce the associated costs of unsafe drivers. Although some argue that the federal government must preempt the states' authority in this area and mandate national driver's license standards, such an approach is unnecessary and substantially less effective than states acting independently and in concert with one another. State approaches have included and can include:

Establishing a "State Clearinghouse for Best Practices" to promote effective regulatory and legislative changes in states that mirrors the on-going efforts of CSG, The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and The National Governor's Association (NGA) on a wide array of issues. Information would be posted electronically and made available through annual or semi-annual written reports. The clearinghouse would document legislative enactments, regulatory changes, executive orders, interim committee reports and judicial decisions and provide links to related articles, publications and reports. Additionally, Clearinghouse staff could provide necessary technical support to states.

Drafting model legislation related to the issuance and verification processes. Model legislation would be collaboratively drafted by CSG, NCSL, and NGA or by an organization experienced with the production of model legislation. Recently, CSG, NCSL, and NGA drafted model legislation to streamline sales and use tax collection. Model legislation would identify issues that have surfaced in all or most states regarding driver's license issuance and verification and create a marker for individual states to target for making changes and modifications.

Developing uniform minimum standards that could be adopted by states for issuance and verification of driver's licenses through a joint CSG, NCSL, and NGA effort. States would have flexibility to go beyond the minimum standards and, therefore, continue to test additional ways of enhancing the integrity of the overall system. Intergovernmental agreements to ensure compliance could also be adopted.

A new "Interstate Compact on Driver's License Integrity" could be developed. Modeled on CSG's recent experience with the development and adoption of the Compact on Adult Offender Supervision, a new compact would replace the existing compacts, which were never designed as comprehensive and are inadequately administered. As a contract among states, the new compact would provide a mutually agreeable and enforceable framework for cooperative state action. Key advantages and elements of a new interstate compact, could include:

States welcome the opportunity to engage the federal government in appropriate partnerships to ensure prompt enactment of these proposed solutions.

Three pieces of federal legislation that would "federalize" the driver's license are currently under review by Congress.

This act, introduced by Rep. Jim Moran and Rep. Tom Davis of Virginia, requires that within five years states will implement driver's license programs with the following requirements:

Driver's licenses will become smart cards with computer chips that store a variety of information.

Biometric data to match the license with its owner will be collected.

States' participation in national databases will be required.

Tamper-resistant security features will be incorporated into all license documents.

States will adopt and implement procedures for accurately documenting the identity and residence of an individual before issuing a driver's license.

This legislation directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish necessary standards within six months of its adoption in consultation with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), the General Services Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The bill also authorizes the federal government to appropriate $315 million for grants to states to help offset initial costs of this new system. The specific language of the bill should be of interest to state leaders, however. It repeatedly directs the Secretary of Transportation to set standards but doesn't require federal funding to pay for new federally imposed requirements.

Similar to the DLMA, this legislation drafted by Sen. Richard Durbin of Illinois would require:

Minimum uniform standards for issuance and administration of state-issued driver's licenses.

Interstate sharing of driving information for verification with enhanced privacy protection within five years of enactment.

Enhanced ability for verification and authentication of the driver's license.

Prevention of abuse and enhanced penalties for internal fraud.

Similar state funding allocation.

DLIA requires the Secretary of Transportation to develop the minimum set of verification and identification requirements and supervise state implementation.

This legislation, introduced by Rep. Jeff Flake of Arizona, would bar Federal agencies from accepting a State-issued driver's license for any identification-related purpose unless the State requires licenses issued to nonimmigrant aliens to expire upon the expiration of the aliens' nonimmigrant visa.

Advocates for "federalizing" the driver's license argue that the state run driver's license system is broken and cannot be fixed without federal intervention and oversight. It has been argued that the national scope of the problem, the need to act quickly, and the associated remedial costs require a federally mandated solution. However, there are a number of significant weaknesses inherent in this approach. They include:

Federal legislation that deals with non-commercial driver's licenses would be subject to years of legal challenges on constitutional grounds and might be struck down.

The federal government took six years to implement the CDL license after passing the enacting legislation; six years to address a pool of licenses that is 1/20^th the size of non-commercial driver's licenses. And, in May 2002, Daniel Hartman, who manages the division at the US Department of Transportation that oversees the CDL process, stated the most significant problem that system faces - 16 years after its enactment - is fraud in the licensing authority offices that administer the system.

"Federalizing" the driver's license would require a host of additional federal administrative and legislative action beyond the initial legislation in order to effectively administer and enforce the federal directives.

The "federalized" driver's license is "the on-ramp to the national ID highway" because it logically requires the federal government to assert control of the driving and personal data collected by states. This data could then be used for a host of non-driving related purposes without state consent.

The "federalized" driver's license that includes so-called "smart technology," as required by the DLMA, opens the driver's license document - without state consent - to a host of other required uses. It creates a document that could hold personal identifying information as well as credit and other information. Currently, the technology does not exist to make such a document tamper-proof. The difficulty of disclaiming use of a fraudulently produced version by the legitimate holder would be much greater as well.

Federal legislation requires the setting of standards without requiring the availability of funding to pay associated costs. These costs could extend far beyond the technology required to implement the federal approach and would likely include increased administrative costs for states and an increased burden to enforce violations of federal law.

Federal legislation, particularly the DLMA, entrenches the role of motor vehicle administrators as the issuers of driver's licenses at the state level. The federal government should not preclude states from reviewing whether their leading law enforcement organization should take an enhanced role in administering driver's license issuance in order to reduce fraud and promote government efficiency.

States have moved expeditiously, both independently and in concert, to address the issues with the current driver's license system. Although much work remains, state leaders increasingly understand the appropriate universe of issues that must be addressed and the urgency of action. State leaders welcome the cooperative efforts of the federal government through appropriate national organizations, but resist "federalizing" the driver's license. CSG and NCSL, in concert with other national organizations, remain committed to working closely together, and through their members - every elected and appointed state official in the nation - to improve the integrity of the state issued driver's license.

Many states are enhancing their driver's license issuance process. Florida may make it a felony for anyone to sell or manufacture a counterfeit driver's license. It may also require non-citizens to show extra identification before being given a new or renewed license. In New Jersey, citizens may have to produce official copies of birth or marriage certificates to get new IDs. More state activities are described below:

Governor Minner's package of homeland security legislation includes S.B. 287 - Driver's License Security - Expands the requirements for persons applying for a driver's license in Delaware. Most significantly, it would require an applicant to provide proof that the applicant is legally in the United States. Sponsored by Sen. Henry and Rep. Smith.

In October, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush ordered tighter controls on issuing driver's licenses to foreigners after the disclosure that three of the Sept. 11 hijackers had overstayed their visas yet had current Florida driver's licenses or state ID cards. Bush ordered that the licenses of foreign drivers expire at the same time as their permits to be in the country. He also directed that motor vehicle officials keep copies of any foreign documents used by license applicants.

Iowa's government is building a clearinghouse that state agencies could use to block the issuance of false driver's licenses and other personal identification documents. The Identity-Security Clearinghouse would electronically tie a resident's birth certificate to the issuance of a Social Security number and only one ID document, such as a driver's license. Safeguarding personal identities could reduce identity theft and fraud.

Kansas

Legislation that would help protect Kansans' financial privacy won preliminary approval in the Senate. The bill would require that a person's thumbprint appear on a driver's license or state identification card, along with a photograph. To obtain a driver's license or identification card, a person would have to show proof of age or identity or both. After July 1, 2003, a thumbprint would be required. The legislation also would require an applicant to submit a Social Security number to be checked by the Division of Motor Vehicles. In addition, $1 would be added to the fee for obtaining a license. That would raise about $750,000 annually, which would cover the cost of validating the new data.

Foreigners applying for Kentucky driver's licenses must now wait up to 30 days to learn if they are eligible, under one of many changes adopted by the state Transportation Cabinet to ferret out illegal applicants. The state also has begun requiring foreign applicants to present photo identification and to prove they are residents of Kentucky by submitting lease agreements, utility bills or similar documents.

An amendment making non-citizens' drivers licenses a different color from citizens' licenses passed 14-10. Immigrants' representatives say making the licenses look different would subject immigrants to harassment and discrimination. Non-citizens' licenses would also expire at the same time as their visas.

A recent change in the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles computer system matches information supplied by Nebraskans with information supplied by the Social Security system.

Additional restrictions in Nebraska include having at least two forms of U.S.-based proof of identification including: birth certificate, a license from out of state that is not mutilated or altered and the signature match, a valid U.S. passport, a valid military identification card, marriage license or divorce decree, a foreign passport, foreign-based birth certificate, parole papers, naturalization papers, certificate of citizenship papers or legal offenders or inmate card.

Governor Gary Johnson signed House Bill 135, allowing the Taxation and Revenue Department to enact a regulation allowing the department to accept alternative documents for the issuance of a driver's license. Prior to the signing of this bill New Mexico State Law in Chapter 66-5-9B required the Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) to obtain the Social Security Number (SSN) as part of the application for a driver's license. The division receives requests a weekly basis from legal resident aliens who are not eligible for a SSN. Many of those interested in driving privileges are the dependants of contract employees at our national labs, military installations and other high tech industry. Other requests come from international students studying in New Mexico. MVD will accept alternative identification documentation including passports, visas issued by the United States as well as other cards issued by the United States immigration and naturalization service.

West Virginia is on the cutting edge of a national effort to impose tighter restrictions on getting a driver's license. West Virginia is the only state in the nation that uses computer images of applicants' faces to make sure they are who they say they are. And the state is moving toward an even more advanced version of the technology. Facial imaging technology measures the bone structure of applicants' faces. It can then match one face against another. When an applicant gets his or her picture taken, the Department of Motor Vehicles computer compares his or her face against the photo already in the database that is connected the applicant's name. That system can catch a person who is pretending to be someone else. The system, which had been in place since 1997, has caught 8,000 to 10,000 potential imposters.

Following the attacks on September 11^th, most states have undertaken efforts to bolster security in the driver's licensing process. Issues such as license design changes, biometric information, increased penalties for fraud, limited replacement licenses, improved training for Department of Motor Vehicle staff members, and other safeguards are all being considered or have been acted on. Below is a summary of actions taken by states.

Several states have enacted legislation that ties expiration of an individual's driver's license to the expiration of the immigration visa. Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota and Ohio have all passed similar legislation. Additionally, Rhode Island and Michigan have passed legislation that requires driver's license applicants to submit proof that they are in the United States legally.

A majority of states have altered the requirements necessary to obtain a drivers license. Previously, in some states, an applicant needed only one form of identification (in some instances, a picture identification was not required). However, following September 11^th, restrictions have been implemented rendering obtaining a drivers license more stringent, but also, safer. Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, to name a few have all mandated increased requirements in the driver's license application process.

A few states have increased the technological aspects of their motorists' driver's licenses. These changes include biometric identifiers like thumbprints, facial structure, voice or the structure of the eye's retina to establish and verify--Georgia and West Virginia currently use this technology. California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, and West Virginia currently collect fingerprints in the driver's licensing process, although only Georgia uses them to verify identity when issuing replacement licenses. Additionally, other states have mandated the implementation of a central database containing information on license holders. Kansas has passed legislation requiring a person's thumbprint appear on the driver's license. Nebraska, in 2003, will introduce a digital license containing personal information on a magnetic barcode. Connecticut will, effective July 1, 2002, issue a new driver's license containing: 1) A 2-D Bar Code with encrypted information, 2) "One-to-one" biometric facial recognition capability, and 3) Six state-of-the-art "overt" and "covert" security features. Minnesota has passed legislation that makes noncitizen's driver's license a different color from a citizen's license.

The federal government has also worked to aid states in the fight against ID fraud. With the passage of the USA Patriot Act, states are prohibited from issuing or renewing the license of anyone seeking to transport hazardous materials unless the U.S. Department of Transportation has cleared the individual seeking the license of any security concerns. Additionally, the Department of Justice must also perform a background investigation into the individual prior to issuance or renewal of a license.

Interstate compacts are the most powerful, durable, and adaptive tools for ensuring cooperative action among the states. As one of the oldest mechanisms for states to work together, their use predates the founding of the nation. Unlike federally imposed mandates that often dictate unfunded and rigid requirements, interstate compacts provide a state-developed structure for collaborative and dynamic action, while building consensus among the states. The very nature of an interstate compact makes it the ideal tool to meet the demand for cooperative state action to develop and enforce stringent standards, while providing an adaptive structure - through an interstate commission or governing authority - that can evolve to meet new and increased demands over time. Today, there are over 200 interstate compacts that have been identified by CSG.

Interstate compacts are adopted by individual states when enabling legislation is enacted. They are subject to the substantive principles of contract law and are protected by the constitutional prohibition against laws that impair the obligations of contracts (US Constitution, Article 1, Section 10). Once enacted, compacts may not be unilaterally renounced by a member state, except as provided by the terms of the compacts themselves. Compacts often contain their own enforcement mechanisms and courts can compel compliance with their terms. These elements make compacts the most effective means of ensuring interstate cooperation.

Establish a formal, legal relationship among states to address common problems or promote a common agenda.

Create independent, multi-state governmental authorities (e.g., commissions) that can address issues more effectively than a state agency acting independently, or when no state has the authority to act unilaterally.

Establish uniform guidelines, standards, or procedures for agencies in the compact's member states.

Create economies of scale to reduce administrative and other costs.

Respond to national priorities in consultation or in partnership with the federal government.

Retain state sovereignty in matters traditionally reserved for the states.

Settle interstate disputes.

Recent examples of interstate compacts illustrate the effectiveness of compacts in solving and addressing critical multi-state issues.

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a mutual aid agreement and partnership between states that exists because all states share a common enemy: the constant threat of disaster.

EMAC allows states to assist one another during emergencies. EMAC offers a quick and easy way for states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts in other states. There are times when state and local resources are overwhelmed and federal assistance is inadequate or unavailable. Out-of-state aid through EMAC helps fill theses gaps.

EMAC establishes a firm legal foundation. Requests for EMAC assistance are legally binding, contractual arrangements that make states that ask for help responsible for reimbursing all out-of-state costs and liable for out-of-state personnel. States are assured that sending aid will not be a financial or legal burden for them.

EMAC provides fast and flexible assistance. EMAC allows states to ask for whatever assistance they need for any emergency, from earthquakes to acts of terrorism. EMACs simple procedures also mean states can dispense with bureaucratic wrangling.

Since being approved by Congress in 1996 as Public Law 104-321, 46 states and two territories have enacted EMAC, and other states are in the process. EMAC played a critical role during the September 11, 2001 attacks by providing assistance to those states in need.

The Council of State Governments, in collaboration with the National Institute of Corrections, has supervised the development and is currently overseeing the introduction and enactment of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. At issue is one of the most significant public safety issues in the nation - the management, monitoring and supervision of adult parolee and probationers in states other than where they were sentenced. The current Interstate Compact, having been in place for more than 60 years, no longer supports an evolving criminal justice system. The new compact will ensure that states can effectively manage adult parolees and probationers who travel to, or are supervised in, states other than where they were sentenced.

Primary changes to the Original Interstate Compact (1937) include:

The establishment of an independent compact operating authority to administer ongoing compact activity.

Gubernatorial appointments from all member states on a national governing commission that meets annually to elect national commission members, who serve as the compact's governing body.

Rule-making authority and provision for significant sanctions to support essential compact operations.

A mandatory funding mechanism sufficient to support essential compact operations (staffing, data collection, training/education, etc.)

Compelling collection of standardized information.